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ABSTRACT 
 
Real estate mutual fund expense ratios are analyzed using panel data comprising 1,130 
observations. The results show that expense ratio is inversely related to share class assets, fund 
family size, and fund age. Conversely, the expense ratio is positively related to larger funds and 
fund families with superior performance. This result is interesting because individual fund classes 
with favorable performance are associated with lower expense ratios. The results are robust to 
common estimation methodologies. 
 
Keywords:  Mutual Fund; Expense Ratio 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
utual fund research has primarily focused on performance (Carhart, 1997) and the relationship 
between fund performance and investment flows (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Fewer publications 
focus on the establishment of mutual fund fees and mutual fund share classes. Mutual fund share 
classes create multiple compensation schemes and this enhances the maximization of asset management fees 
through market segmentation. Each class is priced from a primary portfolio and allows for the distribution of no-
load, front-load, deferred load, and institutional versions of a mutual fund. Factors that affect the mutual fund 
family’s choice of annual expense ratios, limits, and fee waivers represent an important consideration in net of fee 
performance. Prior publications related to this area of research include Luo (2002), who found that actively managed 
equity funds exploit their market power by charging higher fees when the market structure is less competitive. 
Malhotra and McLeod (1997) show that economies of scale in fee setting are present in the mutual fund industry, 
but in the study “size” was defined as the total assets under management of the fund, as opposed to assets held in 
each share class. This is most likely due to their sample period (1992–93), which was a time when the use of 
multiple share classes was not widespread. 
 
This study focuses on a specialized type of equity mutual funds; namely, real estate sector funds. The 
current analysis explores the relationship between the share class expense ratio and age, class size, fund size, family 
size, and past performance. The main findings are as follows: mutual fund sponsors are willing to share economies 
of scale with fund shareholders, but they also exploit market power in a very subtle way by effectively using the 
fund’s market power as well as the market power of the fund family. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Compared with research on fund performance, studies on the pricing strategy of the mutual fund industry 
came much later and were far fewer. Malhotra and McLeod (1997) explore the relationship between fund size and 
fee charged to investors. They find the existence of the economies of scale. Luo (2002) found that actively managed 
equity funds exploit their market power by charging higher fees when the market structure is less competitive. 
 
There is ample evidence that individual investors are more willing to invest in funds with attractive past 
performance, as shown in Nanda, et al. (2007) and Khorana and Servaes (2004). Given this phenomenon, the fund 
M 
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sponsor should increase the expense ratio for those fund classes with favorable performance. Much to our surprise, 
the coefficients to both gross current year performance and net lagged performance are negative. Better-performing 
real estate funds charged a lower fee overall. 
 
Christoffersen and Musto (2002) suggest that mutual fund sponsors set fees while taking consumer’s 
demand elasticity into consideration; i.e., funds with a low elastic clientele charge higher fees. They further argue 
that funds with poor historic records tend to have performance-insensitive investors with low demand elasticity 
because performance-sensitive investors previously redeemed their shares. Similar to our results, Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find that general diversified equity mutual funds generate less favorable gross returns than those 
funds with more focused objectives and that performance-insensitive investors incur higher than average annual 
fees. 
 
MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY 
 
Investors with longer investment horizons who rely mainly on brokers (typically, class B shareholders) are 
charged higher fees. Similar to what Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find in general diversified equity funds, our 
study found that real estate sector funds with the worst historic performance charged higher fees. These findings are 
consistent with the argument of Christoffersen and Musto (2002), who maintain that unsophisticated, performance-
insensitive investors pay higher prices. 
 
We also found that larger real estate sector funds are charging higher fees, and funds charge higher fees if 
their general equity funds siblings in the same fund family have performed better historically. Investors interested in 
a fund family’s general equity funds have to pay higher fees when they diversify into the same family’s real estate 
sector funds. We believe such fund family sponsors are extracting extra rents because they know that employers 
usually allow their employees to choose no more than one fund family for their pension plan. 
 
On the positive side, we find empirical evidence supporting the theory of economy of scale: sponsors 
charge less, the larger a fund class or fund family is, everything else being equal. 
 
This paper differs from Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) in several ways. First, our study focuses on real 
estate sector mutual funds, while theirs focuses on general equity funds. Second, our empirical analyses include 
more control variables, such as the size of the mutual fund and of the fund family on top of the fund class, and we 
also include the fund family’s current and past performance. Third, not only do we find that fund sponsors with poor 
performance charge higher fees to performance-insensitive investors, but we also find that fund sponsors charge 
higher fees to those Class-B shareholders who stuck with the investment. In addition, fund sponsors also exploit 
shareholders with a bundling strategy; namely, real estate sector funds with better-performing general equity fund 
siblings charge higher fees. 
 
DATA 
 
Data is aggregated from 11 editions of Morningstar Principia reports published each January from 1998 to 
2008. Each edition includes data on existing mutual funds as of December 31 from the prior year. This study focuses 
on funds with Morningstar Investment Category classified as “Specialty Real Estate.” Index funds, exchange-traded 
funds, and funds with less than 80% of their assets invested in U.S. equities (which include hybrid funds, bond 
funds, and international funds) are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Survivorship Bias 
 
Survivorship bias is a major concern for empirical studies on mutual funds,
1
 but there are reasons to believe 
that its impact for this specific study is limited. First, 11 annual Morningstar CDs mitigate the survivorship bias 
because the sample includes annual snapshots of dead funds prior to the year of termination. Second, terminated 
funds that are not included in our sample are usually much smaller than existing funds. Chiang et al. (2009) show 
                                                 
1 See Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), among others. 
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that, on average, 0.77% of the total net assets under management by real estate mutual funds were liquidated 
annually.
2
 
 
Since the methodology used to measure fund performance in the present study requires 12 monthly returns, 
a look-ahead bias, as defined by Carhart et al. (2000), is present in our sample selection. 
 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Numbers of fund classes in our sample by end-of-year 1997 to 2007 are 81, 102, 120, 119, 127, 140, 193, 
196, 206, and 198, respectively. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample fund classes. These figures are 
based on pooled observations collected from 1997–2007. 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 25% 75% 
ExpRatio 1389 1.58% 0.58% 0.00% 3.80% 1.11% 2.02% 
FLoad 314 4.82% 1.39% 1.00% 5.75% 4.75% 5.75% 
RLoad 468 2.87% 1.90% 1.00% 5.75% 1.00% 5.00% 
Age (Month) 1482 67 49 0 416 33 91 
ClsAst ($MM) 1482 140 426 0 8294 6 105 
FndAst ($MM) 1472 389 560 0 8294 55 548 
FmlAst ($MM) 1482 44,246 112,272 0 1,244,346 4,065 53,897 
REIT
1  
1482 0.0120 0.0479 -0.1931 0.4948 -0.0124 0.0399 
REIT
3  
1482 0.0149 0.0497 -0.1298 0.3883 -0.0153 0.0427 
CAPM  1482 0.0454 0.1695 -0.4448 0.4358 -0.0965 0.1758 
FF  1482 0.0334 0.1700 -0.3142 0.3778 -0.0262 0.1111 
REITGR 1  
1389 0.0275 0.0474 -0.1813 0.5076 0.0021 0.0567 
REITGR 3  
1389 0.0303 0.0500 -0.1050 0.4140 0.0009 0.0593 
CAPMGR  1389 0.0656 0.1687 -0.4313 0.4617 -0.0082 0.1916 
FFGR  1389 0.0514 0.1708 -0.3018 0.3891 -0.0068 0.1338 
CAPMFML  1315 -0.0100 0.0589 -0.3799 0.3055 -0.0393 0.0100 
FFFML  1315 -0.0093 0.0516 -0.3154 0.3477 -0.0374 0.0139 
 
ExpRatio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees, including 12b-
1 fees, administrative fees, and most other asset-based costs incurred by the fund, but excluding commissions.
3
 
Average ExpRatio is 1.58% in our sample. The 75th percentile is 2.02% while the 25th is 1.11%. The difference 
between 75th and 25th percentile is 89 basis points. 
 
FLoad (front-load) is a sales charge paid by investors upon initial purchase. The load frequently decreases 
with the increase of initial and cumulative investments. There are 314 front-load fund classes in our sample. The 
mean value of the 314 front-load classes is 4.82%.
4
 
 
DLoad is the sales charge incurred at redemption or sale. This fee is often referred to as a back-end load or 
a deferred load. The deferred load usually decreases to zero over a prespecified period. The figure listed in  
 
                                                 
2 That study’s data set is virtually the same as this paper’s. 
3 © 2008 Morningstar, Inc. 
4 The remaining fund classes in our sample do not charge FrontLoad; i.e., the FrontLoad is zero. 
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Morningstar is the highest possible charge, usually applicable during the first year of ownership. There were 468 
fund classes listed with a non-zero DLoad, with a categorical mean value of 2.87%.
5
 
 
Age is the number of months from date of inception of the mutual fund class to the date when Morningstar 
reports the data. The average Age of fund classes in the sample is 67 months. Age distribution had a significant 
variation. The 75th percentile is 91 months, while the 25th percentile is 33 months; the ratio between these quartiles 
is 2.8. 
 
ClsAst is the net assets under management of the share class. The average fund class has $140 million “total 
net assets under management.” The value for 75th percentile is $105 million while the 25th percentile value is only 
$6 million. The ratio between these quartiles is 17.5. 
 
FndAst is the sum of the ClsAst of all share classes of a fund. The average fund had $389 million “total net 
assets under management” for all its classes. The 75th percentile is $548 million and the 25th percentile is $55 
million. The ratio between these two quartiles is 10.0. 
 
FmlAst is the sum of the FndAst within a fund family. The mean value is $44.2 billion. The 75th percentile 
is $53.9 billion and the 25th percentile is $4.1 billion. The ratio between these quartiles is 13.3. 
 
The NAREIT Equity REIT Index was used to estimate fund performance. Additional risk factors were 
provided by the Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.6 Monthly returns were used to calculate fund alphas based on 
data extracted from Morningstar. We generally follow the method of Fama and French (1993) and Kallberg, Liu, 
and Trzcinka (2000) in estimating an individual fund class’s alpha. Here i represents fund i, and t represents month 1 
to 12 in year T. 
 
REIT
1  is the annualized one-factor alpha estimated with NAREIT Equity REIT Index as market index and 
monthly T-Bill rate as risk-free rate (Rf). It is estimated with the following equation (1): 
 
r itRfi t i T
REIT
i T
REIT
t i t, , , , , ,Re    1 3  
(1) 
 
REITRF is the return on the NAREIT Equity REIT Index minus the monthly Treasury bill rate; 
 
REIT
3  is the annualized three-factor alpha estimated with NAREIT Equity REIT Index as market index, 
plus two other Fama-French factors, Size (SMB) and Book-to-Market (HML).
7
 It is estimated in the following 
equation (2): 
 
r itRf s SMB h HMLi t i T
REIT
i T
REIT
t i T
FF
t i T
FF
t i t, , , , , , , ,Re      3 3  
(2) 
 
The mean values of 
REIT
1  and 
REIT
3  are 1.20% and 1.49% respectively. This is consistent with the finding of 
Karlberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000); i.e., managers of Real Estate Mutual Funds on average add value to the fund 
shareholders. The variation of the value-added performance is also very large. The 75th percentile manager value 
added is approximately four percent, whereas the 25th percentile manager value added is a negative one percent 
after adjustments for risk and fees. 
 
ExpRatio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees. FLoad is the 
sales charge investors have to pay when they initially invest in the fund. RLoad is the sales charge an investor may 
                                                 
5 The remaining fund classes in our sample do not charge DeferredLoad; i.e., the DeferredLoad is zero. 
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
7 See Fama and French (1993) and Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000) for details. 
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have to pay when she redeems her share from the fund. Age is the number of months from date of inception of the 
mutual fund class to the date when MorningStar reports the data. ClsAst, FndAst and FmlAst are the net assets under 
management of a share class, a mutual fund and a fund family respectively. 
REIT
1  (
REIT
3 ) is the annualized one-
factor (three-factor, i.e. Market plus HML and SMB) alpha estimated with NAREIT Equity REIT Index as market 
index. 
REITGR 1  (
REITGR 3 ) is calculated as 
REIT
1  (
REIT
3 ) plus ExpRatio. 
CAPM  is the annualized CAPM 
alpha. 
FF  is the annualized Fama-French three factor alpha. CAPMGR  and FFGR are calculated by adding 
ExpRatio to 
CAPM and FF respectively. CAPMFML  ( FFFML ) is the net-asset-weighted average 
annualized CAPM (Fama-French) alphas of all actively managed domestic diversified mutual funds in the family. 
 
CAPM  is the annualized CAPM alpha estimated with CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
stock index as market return (Rm) and monthly T-Bill rate as risk-free rate (Rf). It is estimated in the following 
equation (3): 
 
r RMRFi t i T
CAPM
i T
CAPM
t i t, , , ,      
(3) 
 
FF  is the annualized Fama-French alpha estimated with three factors Rm-Rf, SMB and HML. It is 
estimated with the following equation (4): 
 
r RMRF s SMB h HMLi t i T
FF
i T
FF
t i T
FF
t i T
FF
t i t, , , , , ,        
(4) 
 
These two performance measures are calculated using the broad U.S. stock market index, or “market” 
index. This is less relevant in the immediate study because all funds in the present samples are categorized by 
Morningstar as “Specialty—Real Estate.” We retain the terminology for completeness and comparability. 
 
REITGR 1 is calculated as 
REIT
1  plus ExpRatio. 
 
REITGR 3  is calculated as 
REIT
3  plus ExpRatio. 
 
CAPMGR  is calculated by adding ExpRatio to CAPM . 
 
FFGR  is calculated by adding ExpRatio to FF . 
 
CAPMFML  ( FFFML ) is the size-weighted average annualized CAPM (Fama-French three-factor) 
alphas of all actively managed domestic non-sector mutual funds in the family. 
 
The average 
CAPMFML  ( FFFML ) is -1% (-0.93%). This is consistent with Wermers (2000), who 
found that managers of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds failed to add value to shareholders. 
 
Correlation 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables. We find that the ExpRatio has a small 
negative correlation with FLoad. Its correlation with RLoad is 0.60. The ExpRatio is also negatively correlated with 
LnAge, at -0.17. Its correlation with LnClsAst is negative at -0.44. The correlation with LnFndAst is -0.21. The 
correlation with LnFmlAst is at -0.07. The correlations with net (i.e,. after-expense) performance measures are more 
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complex. While it has a negative correlation with 
REIT
1  at -0.08, the correlation with 
CAPM  is slightly positive at 
0.02. Both correlations are statistically significant, with a confidence level above 95%. The correlations with the two 
other performance measures, 
REIT
3 and 
FF , are slightly positive but statistically insignificant at conventional 
confidence level. The correlation between fund class expense ratio ExpRatio and the gross performance measures 
are all positive and statistically significant, with confidence levels at least 90%. The maximum value is 0.14, that is 
the correlation between ExpRatio and 
REITGR 3 , which is, in our opinion, the most appropriate gross performance 
measure. The confidence level is higher than 99%. The correlations between ExpRatio and the fund family 
performance measures are negative but statistically insignificant. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
We use the following model to study the determinants of a real estate mutual fund class’s expense ratio: 
 
TiiTiTiTiTiTi
TiTiTiTiTi
FmlFmlGrsLnFmlAsset
LnFndAstLnClsAstLnAgeInstRLoadFLoadExpRatio
,1,11,101,9,8,7
6,5,43,2,1,





 
 
FLoad (front-load) is the initial sales commission charged by the brokerage firm to the shareholder. The 
higher it is, the less sophisticated the investors are and the more these investors rely on brokerage firms when 
investing. So according to Christoffersen and Musto (2002), the coefficient β1 should be positive. 
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Table 2:  Correlation Coefficient 
 
ExpRatio FLoad RLoad LnAge LnCls-Ast LnFnd-Ast LnFml-Ast 
REIT
1  
REIT
3  
CAPM  FF  
ExpRatio 1 -0.07 0.60 -0.17 -0.44 -0.21 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.02 
 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.39) (0.04) (0.36) 
FLoad 
 
1 -0.25 0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 
 
  
(0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.08) (0.46) (0.82) (0.18) (0.93) (0.77) 
RLoad 
  
1 -0.03 -0.18 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 
   
(0.22) (0.00) (0.81) (0.13) (0.28) (0.73) (0.52) (0.59) 
LnAge 
   
1 0.51 0.29 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.05 
 
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
LnClsAst 
    
1 0.56 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.07 
 
     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.05) (0.01) 
LnFndAst 
     
1 0.53 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.13 
 
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.01) (0.00) 
LnFmlAst 
      
1 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
 
       
(0.11) (0.34) (0.04) (0.21) 
 
       
1 0.76 0.12 0.12 
 
        
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        
1 0.28 0.31 
 
         
(0.00) (0.00) 
CAPM           1 0.79 
 
          
(0.00) 
FF            1 
 
 
REIT
1
REIT
3
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Table 2 cont. 
 REITGR 1  
REITGR 3  
CAPMGR  FFGR  CAPMFML  FFFML  
ExpRatio 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.33) (0.17) 
FLoad -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.79) (0.38) (0.78) (0.74) (0.66) (0.67) 
RLoad 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.17) (0.20) (0.89) (0.52) 
LnAge -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.55) (0.68) (0.26) (0.01) 
LnClsAst 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.37) (0.21) (0.04) (0.85) (0.63) 
LnFndAst 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.91) (0.02) (0.00) (0.12) (0.82) 
LnFmlAst 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.04) (0.32) (0.69) (0.00) 
 
0.99 0.74 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.17 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
0.76 0.99 0.30 0.31 0.15 0.19 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPM  0.14 0.30 1.00 0.79 0.07 -0.10 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
FF  0.12 0.31 0.79 1.00 -0.12 -0.22 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
REITGR 1  
1 0.75 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.17 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
REITGR 3  
 1 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.19 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPMGR    1 0.79 0.06 -0.08 
    (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
FFGR     1 -0.12 -0.21 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPMFML      1 0.65 
      (0.00) 
FFFML       1 
 
ExpRatio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees. FLoad is the 
sales charge investors have to pay when they initially invest in the fund. RLoad is the sales charge an investor may 
have to pay upon redemption. LnAge is the natural logarithm of the age of a fund class. LnClsAst, LnFndAst and 
LnFmlAst are natural logarithm of the net assets under management of a share class, a mutual fund and a fund family 
respectively. 
REIT
1  (
REIT
3 ) is the annualized one-factor (three-factor, i.e. market index, SMB and HML) alpha 
estimated with NAREIT Equity REIT Index as market index. 
REITGR 1  (
REITGR 3 ) is calculated as 
REIT
1   
(
REIT
3 ) plus ExpRatio. 
CAPM  ( FF ) is the annualized CAPM (Fama-French three-factor) alpha. Add ExpRatio 
and we have 
CAPMGR  and FFGR . CAPMFML  ( FFFML ) is the net-asset-weighted average annualized 
CAPM (Fama-French) alphas of all actively managed domestic diversified mutual funds in the family. 
 
REIT
1
REIT
3
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RLoad (rear-load) is the sales commission charged by the brokerage firm to the shareholder if they decide 
to redeem their investment in the short term. It usually decreases over the time. Thus, funds with higher RLoad 
levels tend to have less sophisticated investors with longer investment horizons. We anticipate that fund sponsors 
will exploit this naivete and loyalty and charge a higher expense ratio, so β2 should also be positive. 
 
β5, β6, and β7 are coefficients of the natural logarithm of the assets under management of a fund-class, fund 
(with all its classes), and all of a fund family’s actively managed general equity funds. If there exist economies of 
scale and fund sponsors are willing to share them with shareholders, then these three coefficients should have 
negative signs. 
 
TiGr ,  represents 
REITGR 1 , 
REITGR 3 , 
CAPMGR ,  and FFGR of fund class i in year T 
respectively. 
 
1, Ti  represents the corresponding net performance measures of fund class i in the previous year. 
 
The worse a fund’s (historic) performance, the less sophisticated its current investors are. According to the 
hypothesis of Christoffersen and Musto (2002), the higher expense ratio would be charged. So we should anticipate 
negative β8 and β9. 
 
TiFml ,  ( 1, TiFml ) are  
CAPMFml  and FFFml  of fund class i in year T (T-1). It is the average 
performance of actively managed general equity fund in the same fund family. 
 
Because it is common practice that employers usually allow their employees to pick just one fund family 
for their pension plan, if investors tend to believe that the performance of the domestic non-sector equity mutual 
fund in the same family has a spillover effect on real estate sector funds, then fund sponsors with better performing 
non-sector equity funds may exploit this by applying a higher expense ratio. So we should expect that both β10 and 
β11 are positive. 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of multivariate random effect GLS regression. Because the data set 
used in our study is longitudinal, there are fund class-specific characteristics that are not relevant to the immediate 
study. They are differences between fund classes, but they are largely constant along the time series. Therefore we 
add fund-class specific residual δ as a random effect in our regression instead of applying an OLS or GLS 
estimation. Wooldridge (2002, chapter 10) and Greene (1997, chapter 14) present additional details on fixed-effects 
and random-effects models. 
 
Results in column II are qualitatively similar to those in column III. For brevity, the discussion focuses on 
results in column III. We also believe the performance measure applied in column III to be the most appropriate. 
 
The coefficient of Fload is not statistically significant at conventional confidence level; i.e., Front Load 
fund classes’ expense ratios are not significantly different from those of no-load retail (vs. institutional) fund classes. 
The coefficient of Dload is 0.12109 and significant at a confidence level higher than 99%. This is consistent with 
our anticipation that the fund sponsor charges a higher expense ratio to class B investors who have stuck to the 
mutual funds because those investors will be punished with a higher rear-load if they decide to redeem funds earlier. 
 
The coefficient of the Institution dummy variable is -0.00044, but it is marginally statistical insignificant at 
confidence level 89%; i.e., there is weak evidence that fund classes targeting institutional investors charge an 
expense ratio approximately four basis points lower than their retail counterparts ceteris paribus. 
 
The coefficient of the age of a fund class is negative and, holding other variables constant, older fund 
classes possess lower expense ratios. 
 
The coefficient of the (natural logarithm of the) fund class size is negative; i.e., larger fund classes charge 
lower expense ratios. The coefficient of fund size is positive, while that of the fund family size is again negative. 
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These results pose a puzzle prima facie. Size poses two effects on the expense ratio of a fund class. On one hand, 
large size may bring the benefit of economies of scale, and if we further assume the mutual fund industry is at least 
partially competitive, then the economies of scale effect will lower a fund class’s expense ratio. On the other hand, 
larger size may also represent more market power. Luo (2002) found evidence that mutual fund sponsors are ready 
to charge a higher expense ratio in a less competitive situation. Our findings show that larger mutual fund families 
enjoy some benefits of economies of scale, and fund sponsors are willing to share a portion of that benefit with fund 
shareholders. Meanwhile, larger mutual fund sponsors are ready to exploit their dominant market position by 
charging a higher fee ratio, although at fund class level, shareholders of larger fund classes may enjoy a lower fee. 
 
Table 3:  Multivariate Random Effect GLS Estimation Results (# of Observations Included is 1030) 
Intercept 0.01784 0.01788 0.01801 0.01787 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FLOAD  0.00908 0.01090 0.00994 0.01032 
 
(0.28) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) 
RLOAD  0.11712 0.12109 0.11380 0.11639 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institution -0.00042 -0.00044 -0.00072 -0.00053 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.01) (0.06) 
Ln(Age) -0.00051 -0.00043 -0.00059 -0.00041 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Ln(ClsAst) -0.00018 -0.00020 -0.00018 -0.00020 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Ln(FndAst) 0.00022 0.00022 0.00009 0.00015 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.07) 
Ln(FmlAst) -0.00014 -0.00016 -0.00007 -0.00014 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.29) (0.03) 
REIT
TGR ,1  -0.00150    
 
(0.13) 
   
REIT
TGR ,3   -0.00161   
  
(0.09) 
  
CAPM
TGR    0.00102  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
TGR     0.00008 
    
(0.76) 
REIT
T 1,1   -0.00525    
 
(0.00) 
   
REIT
T 1,3    -0.00568   
  
(0.00) 
  
CAPM
T 1    0.00090  
   
(0.01) 
 
FF
T 1     -0.00017 
    
(0.74) 
FF
TFML  0.00117 0.00126 0.00079 0.00042 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.29) (0.58) 
FF
TFML 1  0.00136 0.00190 0.00015 0.00040 
 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.83) (0.58) 
Overall R2 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.47 
 
Research results differ on whether a mutual fund’s historical performance is a good indication of future 
performance. Carhart (1997) presents strong evidence that historical performance is a good predictor of future 
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performance when the analysis is constrained to poor historical performance. Funds whose historical performance 
ranks in the lowest decile are more likely to generate poor performance in the future. 
 
There is ample evidence that individual investors are more willing to invest in funds with attractive past 
performance, as shown in Nanda et al. (2007) and Khorana and Servaes (2004). Given this phenomenon, the fund 
sponsor should increase the expense ratio for those fund classes that show favorable performance. Much to our 
surprise, the coefficients to both gross current year performance and net lagged performance are negative. Better-
performing real estate funds overall charged a lower fee. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) argue that funds with 
worse historic performance tend to charge higher fees because the remaining shareholders tend to be insensitive to 
(net) performance. Here, our empirical results are consistent with what Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find with 
general equity funds. The two coefficients of the current gross and past net performance (β8 and β9) are both 
negative and statistically significant, with at least a 90% confidence level. 
 
The two coefficients of the current and lagged family performance (β10 and β11) may provide further 
evidence that fund sponsors are exploiting the shareholders whenever possible. They are both positive and 
statistically significant. The real estate sector fund class charged a higher expense ratio when other equity funds 
within the same family performed better. Here we found that the sponsors of the real estate sector fund classes do 
charge a higher expense ratio, but not because of the funds’ own (historic) performance. The higher expense ratio 
appears to be part of a bundling strategy. Whenever the fund family’s general equity funds have a better 
performance, sponsors charge a higher fee for their real estate sector fund classes’ siblings. 
 
Results in columns IV and V are shown here but we believe the performance measures are not as 
appropriate as those in columns II and III (see Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka, 2000). We present the results here for 
the sake of completeness of our research. 
 
Economic Significance 
 
Here, we discuss the economic significance of the estimate results. The estimated coefficients in column II 
suggest that fund classes with a 5% back-end load on average charge a 60-basis-point higher expense ratio versus 
the no-load retail fund class. The 75th percentile old fund class on average charges an annual fee less by 4.4 basis 
points versus the 25th percentile old fund class. 
 
On average the 75th percentile large fund class charges an annual fee less by 5.7 basis points than the 25th 
percentile fund class. On average the 75th percentile large fund charges an annual fee higher by 5.1 basis points than 
the 25th percentile large fund. On average, a fund class with the 75th percentile large fund family charges an annual 
fee less by 4.1 basis points than those with 25th percentile large fund family. An increase of current gross 
performance from 25th percentile to 75th percentile will lead to a decrease of 0.9 basis point of annual fee. An 
increase of previous year net performance from 25th percentile to 75th percentile will lead to a decrease of 3.3 basis 
points of annual fee. An increase of current (previous) year average performance of the general equity fund in the 
same fund family from 25th percentile to 75th percentile will lead to an increase of 0.6 (1.0) basis point of annual 
fee. 
 
Robustness Check 
 
Outlier observations may distort results of estimation. To avoid this, we screen out all the observations with 
at least one independent variable that falls into the top or bottom one percentile. We then run the random effect GLS 
estimation again and present the result in Table 4. Results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. To obtain 
robust variance estimates, we further perform GEE estimation with semi-robust variance estimator (see Hardin and 
Hilber, 2003, for further details about GEE estimation of GLM). Results are presented in Table 5. To avoid the 
extreme value effects, we further perform the same GEE estimation while excluding extreme observations 
containing at least one variable that falls into the top or bottom one percentile. The results are generally robust. Last, 
we re-run the same estimation with extreme value (defined as top 1% and bottom 1%) excluded. The results are 
presented in Table 6. The results are robust. 
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Table 4:  Robustness Check: Multivariate Random Effect GLS Estimation Results with Extreme Value Excluded 
Intercept 0.01707 0.01729 0.01727 0.01703 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FLOAD 0.01194 0.01146 0.01131 0.01051 
 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.24) 
DLOAD 0.11648 0.12021 0.11019 0.11239 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institution -0.00049 -0.00051 -0.00079 -0.00079 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(Age) -0.00061 -0.00049 -0.00065 -0.00041 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Ln(ClsAst) -0.00016 -0.00018 -0.00017 -0.00018 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(FndAst) 0.00031 0.00027 0.00012 0.00016 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.09) 
Ln(FmlAst) -0.00010 -0.00013 0.00000 -0.00008 
 
(0.16) (0.07) (0.98) (0.27) 
REIT
TGR ,1  -0.00289    
 
(0.01) 
   
REIT
TGR ,3   -0.00243   
  
(0.02) 
  
CAPM
TGR    0.00113  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
TGR     0.00027 
    
(0.38) 
REIT
T 1,1   -0.00607    
 
(0.00) 
   
REIT
T 1,3    -0.00671   
  
(0.00) 
  
CAPM
T 1    0.00113  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
T 1     -0.00006 
    
(0.91) 
FF
TFML  0.00283 0.00254 0.00160 0.00063 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.52) 
FF
TFML 1  0.00006 0.00087 -0.00145 -0.00090 
 
(0.95) (0.39) (0.13) (0.36) 
Overall R2 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.48 
# of Observations 923 928 919 896 
The regressions run are the same as those presented in Table 3 but observations with the extreme values in both ends (> = 99% or 
< = 1%) are excluded. In all the models the fraction of variance due to random effect is more than 92%. 
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Table 5:  Robustness Check: Multivariate GEE Estimation Results with Semi-Robust Variance Estimator 
Intercept 0.01792 0.01787 0.01805 0.01801 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FLOAD 0.01435 0.01558 0.01402 0.01466 
 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) 
DLOAD 0.15989 0.16008 0.15726 0.15856 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institution -0.00110 -0.00110 -0.00137 -0.00121 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Ln(Age) -0.00035 -0.00028 -0.00040 -0.00030 
 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.21) 
Ln(ClsAst) -0.00038 -0.00039 -0.00038 -0.00040 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(FndAst) 0.00028 0.00027 0.00016 0.00021 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.23) (0.13) 
Ln(FmlAst) -0.00022 -0.00023 -0.00016 -0.00021 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.13) (0.04) 
REIT
TGR ,1  -0.00140    
 
(0.14) 
   
REIT
TGR ,3   -0.00078   
  
(0.47) 
  
CAPM
TGR    0.00109  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
TGR     0.00029 
    
(0.36) 
REIT
T 1,1   -0.00506    
 
(0.00) 
   
REIT
T 1,3    -0.00560   
  
(0.00) 
  
CAPM
T 1    0.00076  
   
(0.01) 
 
FF
T 1     -0.00002 
    
(0.98) 
FF
TFML  0.00131 0.00125 0.00096 0.00070 
 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.30) (0.48) 
FF
TFML 1  0.00125 0.00185 0.00011 0.00030 
  (0.09) (0.01) (0.88) (0.65) 
The number of observations is 1030. p-values are in the parentheses. 
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Table 6:  Robustness Check: Multivariate GEE Estimation Results with Semi-Robust  
Variance Estimator and with Extreme Value Excluded 
Intercept 0.01704 0.01723 0.01732 0.01683 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FLOAD 0.01568 0.01504 0.01445 0.01315 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.23) 
DLOAD 0.14175 0.14664 0.14620 0.14741 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institution -0.00079 -0.00088 -0.00127 -0.00135 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(Age) -0.00048 -0.00036 -0.00043 -0.00018 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.48) 
Ln(ClsAst) -0.00026 -0.00029 -0.00032 -0.00034 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(FndAst) 0.00032 0.00028 0.00014 0.00018 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.36) (0.26) 
Ln(FmlAst) -0.00014 -0.00017 -0.00008 -0.00013 
 
(0.23) (0.14) (0.51) (0.28) 
REIT
TGR ,1  -0.00298    
 
(0.00) 
   
REIT
TGR ,3   -0.00210   
  
(0.05) 
  
CAPM
TGR    0.00121  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
TGR     0.00038 
    
(0.26) 
REIT
T 1,1   -0.00587    
 
(0.00) 
   
REIT
T 1,3    -0.00679   
  
(0.00) 
  
CAPM
T 1    0.00100  
   
(0.00) 
 
FF
T 1     -0.00017 
    
(0.82) 
FF
TFML  0.00284 0.00261 0.00185 0.00102 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.36) 
FF
TFML 1  -0.00014 0.00088 -0.00158 -0.00110 
  (0.88) (0.32) (0.07) (0.22) 
# of Observations 923 928 919 896 
The regressions run are the same as those presented in Table 5 but observations with the extreme values in both ends (> = 99% or 
< = 1%) are excluded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study focuses on how the sponsor of a real estate sector mutual fund establishes the expense ratio. We 
find that sponsors of larger families and fund classes are willing to share some economies of scale with the 
shareholders of fund classes. Our research also finds that the larger funds tend to charge a higher expense ratio. If 
we believe that the larger fund size is a proxy of market power, then this provides evidence that the sponsors are 
exploiting market power. Consistent with the arguments made in Christoffersen and Musto (2002), we find real 
estate sector funds with worse (historical) performance charge a higher fee; this occurs because sophisticated 
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shareholders flee from funds with bad performance. Further, we find funds with a higher rear load charge higher 
fees; this provides evidence that naïve investors’ long-term loyalty has been exploited. Last but not least, this study 
finds that those fund classes with better-performing general funds in the same family charge a higher fee. 
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